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Since the passage of major pollution control statutes in the early
1970s, including such iconic regulatory programs as the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”) 1 and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 2 we have learned quite a
lot about environmental problems and how they may be addressed in
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I wish to thank the participants in the
conference for their helpful comments when this paper was presented. Special thanks to Professor
Kalyani Robbins and the School of Law for making the conference such a rewarding and
stimulating experience. I also would like to thank my colleague, Sam Jordan, for helpful
suggestions and conversation. Dan Sheffner provided valuable research assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1990).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1991).
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effective and efficient ways. Of course, there is still much that we do
not know, and much of what we think we know about environmental
problems is mostly contingent and provisional: the things that seem clear
to us now may be decidedly less clear in the future. Indeed, the
provisional quality of our knowledge is one of the defining
characteristics of our relationship to natural systems and environmental
law: both are full of surprises and unexpected and unintended
consequences. 3
One thing that does seem clear, however, is that the iconic statutes
of the 1970s are built on premises that no longer obtain. This is not to
suggest that these statutory programs have not adapted to the changing
character of environmental problems, nor that these programs have not
performed tolerably well over the last forty years. A case can be made,
despite their outmoded foundations, that our 1970s-vintage regulatory
programs have been remarkably successful in addressing complex,
difficult environmental problems. 4 But we can, and should, do better.
To nudge environmental law in the direction of smarter and more
effective problem-solving, it would be wise to take a hard look at
existing policies and regulatory tools. There is much good work that has
been done on that front.
Creative, innovative thinking and
implementation have shown that careful use of market mechanisms,
information sharing, and more traditional standard-setting tools can be
used effectively to address environmental issues. Whether and under
what circumstances these tools can effectively be deployed involve
questions that have been, and continue to be, much debated.
Contributions to the debate have been important and significant. At the
same time, a singular focus on policy instruments and regulatory tools
3. See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990). For views of environmental law that emphasize the complexity,
uncertainty, and unintended consequences of natural systems, see Craig Anthony Arnold, FourthGeneration Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 771 (2011); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 189 (2002); J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of
Science in Environmental Law: Why We Should, Why We Don’t, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1527 (2008); A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling
of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the
New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995).
4. For some indicators of the success of the CWA and CAA, see U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR
AND RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020,
SUMMARY
REPORT
(Mar.
2011),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/summaryreport.pdf; William L. Andreen, Water Quality
Today – Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004).
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fails to address more fundamental issues. It is also important to
critically examine the institutional arrangements that the regulatory
programs have created and fostered. As Professors Freeman and Farber
have argued, “although it is important to choose the right regulatory
tools, it is equally crucial to design the optimal institutional
arrangements for deploying them.” 5 And here, too, there has been much
innovative thinking and corresponding debate.
The focus of this article is on the latter, institutional side of
environmental regulation and management. In what follows, I hope to
stimulate serious discussion directed at re-imagining what effective
institutions for environmental protection and management might look
like. I have chosen to use the term “regional governance” as an
organizing theme. At its core, a regional approach re-imagines how
national and local interests interact, unfettered by notions of dual
sovereignty and federalism that continue to plague our thinking about
environmental governance. The regional approach I advocate here
refuses to privilege the states as presumptively appropriate partners with
the national government in managing the complex environmental
problems we must address. Instead, environmental management should
be viewed more as a means of giving voice, rather than authority, to
shifting aggregations of sub-national interests and institutions.
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a brief
introduction to the structured institutional arrangements under the CAA
and the CWA. I discuss how these programs have evolved in ways that
depart from what may have been originally anticipated and how their
structure poses impediments to effective environmental management.
Part II provides a short summary of current thinking about the
institutional architecture of our environmental programs, focusing
primarily on the “environmental federalism” scholarship of recent years.
I offer reasons for abandoning federalism as an appropriate institutional
framework.
Part III presents a conceptual, rather than tightly
engineered, argument for regional governance institutions, which I call
Regional Environmental Management Agencies (“REMAs”).
I
speculate about the benefits of such institutions and provide a rough
architectural rendering of how such institutions might be structured and
the powers they may exercise. The argument is provisional. I make no
claim to have comprehensively identified the issues that may arise in
restructuring institutions along regional lines, nor do I claim to have

5. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J.
795, 823 (2005).
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fully grasped the range of costs, benefits, and difficulties that might
result.
I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND PROBLEMS
OF OVER-CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: THE CLEAN AIR
ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT
The institutional arrangements under both the CAA and the CWA
are experiments in cooperative federalism, creating partnerships between
the states and the national government. 6 Although the respective
programs differ in significant respects, both involve a sharing
arrangement in which regulatory authority is divided between EPA and
the states. These arrangements reflect both practical considerations and
constitutional limits placed on Congress’s authority to mandate state
participation in federal regulatory programs. 7 They are also deeply
steeped in a loose commitment to “dual sovereignty” or “dual
federalism,” in which program responsibilities are conceived in terms of
distinct, yet integrated spheres of authority as between the national
government and the states. 8 State roles are typically based on accepted,
6. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1984)
(describing the CAA as a “partnership between the states and the federal government” and as “an
experiment in federalism”); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (“The Clean Water Act
anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared
objective: ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.’”) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)); see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1147, 1174-76 (1995) (describing
cooperative federalism model in environmental law).
7. For discussion, see Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010);
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 663 (2001).
8. Robert Schapiro describes “dual federalism” as “the concept that the state and national
governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres of authority.” Robert A. Schapiro,
Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005). As Professor
Schapiro notes, however, dual federalism no longer provides an accurate portrait of how power is
allocated in our nation. Id. Instead, as Professor Greve argues, “American federalism has become
an administrative, ‘cooperative federalism’: state and local governments administer and implement
federal programs.” Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 558
(2000). Nonetheless:
the conceptual framework remains pervasive in theory and doctrine. Dual federalism
defined the core issue of federalism as the separation of state and national power. The
rigid boundary that dual federalism sought to erect has disappeared, but the basic
conception of federalism continues to be a system of independent national and state
governments that must be protected from each other. Federalism remains an exercise in
line-drawing. . . . Dualist conceptions survive, even after dual federalism has withered
away.
Schapiro,supra note 8, at 246. The structure of our major environmental programs, such as the
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but ill-defined notions of functions deemed by tradition to “belong” to
state and local governments, such as land use controls. 9 State
participation in these programs is not, in theory, compelled by federal
law; the states may choose to assume some responsibility for program
administration or may leave that responsibility to EPA or other
responsible federal agencies. 10 Accordingly, despite widespread State
participation in the implementation of the CAA and CWA, these
programs are of a distinctly national character.11
An important feature of both the CAA and CWA is that, in general,
the federal standards promulgated under these programs are both
national in scope and do not preempt state regulatory efforts entirely. At
the national level, the CAA and CWA generally establish minimum
standards, or “regulatory floors.” 12 The states may choose to adopt more
stringent standards, 13 but there are important exceptions. 14 A number of
states have adopted more stringent regulatory standards, 15 but a few have
CAA and CWA, reflect this “dualist conception,” and it is these vestigial remnants of dual
federalism in our environmental programs that I argue need critical re-examination and reform.
9. For example, the Clean Water Act provides that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.” 33
U.S.C. §1251(b) (2006). Similarly, the Clean Air Act provides: “that air pollution prevention . . .
and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990).
11. The programs also contemplate shared enforcement responsibilities between state and
federal authorities, supplemented by provisions for citizen enforcement. See Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C), 7413, 7604 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342(b)(7), 1365
(1990).
12. On “regulatory floors,” see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).
13. For the CAA, see, for example, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264-65 (1976)
(states may adopt more protective air quality regulations so long as federal “minimum conditions”
are met). On the CWA, see Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (CWA
“allows States to impose more stringent water quality controls”). The CAA and CWA include
broad non-preemption provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1972).
14. The most important exception relates to regulation of motor vehicles. For a discussion of
the CAA’s intricate regulatory program for motor vehicles, see Patrick Schlesinger & Michael J.
Horowitz, Regulation of Mobile Sources: Motor Vehicles and Nonroad Engines, in CLEAN AIR ACT
HANDBOOK 279-80 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 517-51 (6th ed. 2009); Ann E.
Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1108-27 (2009).
15. The most prominent example is California’s efforts to impose more stringent emissions
limitations on motor vehicles than are required by federal standards. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 171-72
(2006). For general discussion of how states may produce more stringent environmental regulation,
see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
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placed “regulatory ceilings” on state implementing agencies, precluding
those agencies from adopting standards that are more stringent than the
federal floors. 16 The non-preemption commitments in the CAA and
CWA may provide space for a dynamic regulatory regime in which
innovative techniques and policies can flow from the bottom up, rather
than from the top down. 17 On the other hand, national standards may
promote complacence; many states may adopt a singular focus on
meeting national mandates, precluding critical evaluation of what may
be best suited to address specific, and more local, environmental needs.
The experiences under the CAA and CWA, respectively,
demonstrate that the division of regulatory labor as between the federal
government and the states is neither static nor entirely predictable. As I
will illustrate below, the experience under the CAA has been
paradoxical. On the one hand, there has been a gradual, but ultimately
dramatic, decline in the role states generally play in protecting local air
resources. On the other hand, the states have played, and continue to
play, a primary role in controlling interstate air pollution. Experience
under the CWA has followed a similar, but distinct evolutionary path.
States now play a rather marginalized role in determining how pollution
from existing, local point sources should be controlled, but play a
dominant role in ensuring that water quality is protected, even in
interstate waters and in cases involving discharges from federally
permitted projects. The latter roles of the states have now become
central to the overall success of the CWA’s regulatory program,
representing a fairly dramatic shift from the underlying premises of the
program. The large scale shifts in the respective responsibilities of the
national and state governments under both the CWA and CAA support a
careful reevaluation of the programs’ institutional arrangements.

Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585-614 (2001).
16. See, e,g., Iowa Code § 459.311 (West 2013) (prohibiting Iowa Department of Natural
Resources from adopting rules governing concentrated animal feeding operations that are more
stringent than federal requirements). See generally Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency
Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1387-90 (1995).
17. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 41 (1997) (describing how states, as
“first innovators in efforts to rehabilitate Brownfield sites,” influenced the shape of federal
Brownfields policies). For a general discussion of how states may contribute to the shape of
national policy, see Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 19 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 288 (2005) (“The different governments can learn from each other. They can sharpen
their understanding of how best to define and to implement important governmental safeguards.”).
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The Clean Air Act and the Paradox of State Authority

The Clean Air Act’s program of cooperative federalism is complex,
but its core lies in the relation between Sections 109 18 and 110, 19 which
provide for state implementation plans (“SIPs”) to secure compliance
with federally-promulgated national ambient air quality standards
(“NAAQS”). The NAAQS govern “criteria” pollutants, which currently
include ozone, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide,
nitrogen dioxide, and lead. 20 The CAA directs EPA to promulgate
NAAQS that are “requisite to protect the public health” and “public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutant[s] in the ambient air.” 21 The resulting
standards are, in theory, national in scope and uniform. 22 In practice,
however, this uniformity is tempered by two factors: (1) the applicable
“attainment date” to which an area is subject; and (2) an anti-degradation
program, known as the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”)
program, that requires areas to maintain air quality that exceeds that
required by the NAAQS. 23 The NAAQS must be reviewed by EPA, and
revised if necessary, no less than every five years.24
As originally conceived, the role of the states in the NAAQS
program was to select which existing sources of pollutants to regulate
and how to regulate them. 25 Indeed, the CAA provides “that air
pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the
primary responsibility of States and local governments.” 26 That
commitment is, however, hedged; “new sources” are subject to
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990).
20. For information on the NAAQS, see generally Technology Transfer Network: National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ (last visited
May 3, 2013).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1977); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S.
457 (2001).
22. For criticism of the mandate for nationally uniform standards, see James Krier, On the
Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System – And Why it Matters, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1226 (1995).
23. See Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A Defense of
Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67, 76 (2001) [hereinafter Williams,
Cooperative Federalism].
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (1977).
25. See, e.g., Union Electric Co. v. E.P.A, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) (recognizing that
through SIP process, the CAA “place[s] the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control
strategies on the States”); Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (“[T]he
State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emissions limitations it seems best suited to its particular
situation.”).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1990).
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categorical, technology-based emissions standards promulgated by
EPA 27 or, in some cases, more individualized technological limitations
based on federal standards. 28 The states’ selected control measures are
set forth in SIPs for each of the NAAQS and the states must demonstrate
to EPA that their choices will limit emissions sufficiently to attain the
NAAQS within the time frames set forth in the statute. 29 Permitting the
states to develop the SIPs, it was thought, might mitigate at least some of
the more undesirable centralizing aspects of nationally uniform
standards, while still providing a floor of public health and welfare
protection. 30
EPA is authorized to approve a state’s SIP or to disapprove it in
part or as a whole. 31 An approved SIP becomes enforceable by the
State, by EPA, or in some circumstances by citizens. 32 In the event that
a state fails to submit a required SIP or fails to correct deficiencies in a
disapproved SIP, EPA is obligated to promulgate and implement a
federal implementation plan, or FIP. 33 Thus, states that choose to opt
out of the CAA’s program of shared responsibilities will be subject to
preemptive federal regulation, as well as possible loss of federal
funding. 34 The development and approval process also applies to
revisions to an existing SIP. 35
27. 42 U.S.C. §7411 (1990).
28. See 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(4) (2006) (new “major emitting facilities” in clean air areas must
meet “best available control technology” limitations); 7503(a)(3) (new or modified stationary
sources in nonattainment areas must comply with “the lowest achievable emission rate”).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §7407(a) (1990) (describing state responsibilities).
30. For example, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 493 (2001),
Justice Breyer suggested that the SIP process may mitigate the statutorily-required “cost-blind”
approach to establishing NAAQS. (Breyer, J., concurring) (“States may consider economic costs
when they select the particular control devices used to meet the standards, and industries
experiencing difficulty in reducing their emissions can seek an exemption or waiver from the state
implementation plan.”). The actual costs of program implementation may also be affected by the
amount of “slippage” in achieving compliance with the NAAQS which is permitted or tolerated by
the implementing agencies. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315-16 (1999) (noting
that “standards may merely be the government’s opening demand in negotiations, and the final
bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other side”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 57 (2001) (slippage between mandated
standards and enforcement may “represent ‘bottom up’ efforts to improve the rationality of the
command statutory system in light of practical experience with its implementation”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (1990).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (1990).
35. See William F. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059,
1078-79 (1981) (describing the “double key” of state and federal procedural requirements governing
SIP revisions). EPA regulations governing SIP requirements now run to 1700 pages. See 40 C.F.R.
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The CAA’s sharing arrangement between EPA and the states has
proven to be a massively complex undertaking. 36 The delays in, and
costs of, developing conforming SIPs and moving them through the
federal approval process are extraordinarily high. 37 Moreover, the
technical basis for determining whether the control measures selected by
a state will lead to attainment of a NAAQS is subject to considerable
uncertainties. 38 Limits on modeling techniques and uncertainties in
predictions of future emissions growth, for example, often yield SIPs
that have a shot-in-the-dark quality about them.
The complexity increases when one drills deeper down into the
actual SIP development process. In some sense, the notion of a “state”
implementation mischaracterizes the planning process in a significant
number of instances. SIPs are not typically state-wide plans, though
some components may have state-wide application. 39 Instead, SIPs are
designed to attain the NAAQS in specific “air quality control regions”
(“AQCR”), 40 which may include several local jurisdictions. In some
cases, particularly those involving large metropolitan areas—AQCRs
may straddle across state jurisdictional boundaries.41 As a consequence,
air quality planning and SIP development under the CAA is often interjurisdictional, both within the respective states (involving several local
jurisdictions) and among states, with attendant coordination problems. 42
The procedural and substantive complications that have historically
characterized the SIP process provided space for EPA to approve,
§§ 51 & 52.
36. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation
Plans – Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2004); John P.
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1193-94 (1995)
(discussing complexity of SIPs).
37. See generally Pedersen, supra note 35, at 1072-93(describing complexities and high
transaction costs of SIPs). For an extreme example of the delays that can attend the SIP
development and approval process, see Texas v. E.P.A., 690 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2012)
(describing more than sixteen year process involving a revision to the state of Texas’s SIP).
38. See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 265, 280-87 (2009) (discussing uncertainties concerning adequacy of SIPs).
39. For an example of a SIP with both local and state-wide elements, see the Illinois State
Implementation Plan, at Region 5, Air and Radiation, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r5/r5ard.nsf/SIPs%20View%20By
%20State%20Main%20View!OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&Expand=1#1 (last visited May 3,
2013).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1990) (“Each State shall . . . adopt . . . a plan which provides for
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air quality control region
(or portion thereof) within such State.”).
41. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program
Under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L. J. 1461, 1466 (1966) (describing SIPs and ACQRs).
42. See id. at 1468.
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without fear of judicial reversal, SIPs that had little prospect of attaining
the NAAQS. 43 The EPA had powerful incentives to approve even
highly dubious SIPs. Disapproval not only imposes more costs on
states, souring the prospects of ongoing cooperative relations, it also
imposes very high costs on EPA. The mandate to develop and
implement FIPs when states are unwilling to develop and implement
conforming SIPs diverts EPA resources from other tasks that the agency
will often regard as far more important. Moreover, it is doubtful that
EPA could effectively implement a FIP without significant support from
relevant state actors. 44 These practical realities have served further to
mitigate the centralizing aspects of the CAA’s reliance on nationally
uniform air quality standards. 45
In fact, during the early years of the CAA’s implementation, the
complexities of the SIP development and approval process, the absence
of nationally-mandated control measures, and EPA’s limited resources
combined to provide the states with considerable leverage over the shape
of the regulatory program. 46 The result may be described as a form of
negotiated federalism, in which state and national roles were somewhat
fluid and dynamic. 47 Thus, under the original framework of the CAA,
the states were given, and enjoyed in practice, a fairly wide measure of
discretion in choosing which sources to regulate and how stringently to
regulate them.
This discretion remains significant, but has become severely
constrained as the CAA has evolved over time. The widespread
inadequacy of SIPs left millions of American exposed to unhealthy
levels of air pollution. 48 In 1977, Congress responded by imposing more
detailed requirements for SIPs, including permitting programs for new

43. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-95 (describing failures of the SIP process).
44. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 BOSTON C. L. REV. 1, 79-80 (2011)
(“participants understand that the programs of cooperative federalism on which the big federal
environmental statutes depend would implode without the good faith participation of state
environmental agencies”) [hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; Dwyer, supra note 36, at
1216-19.
45. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1276-77 (2009) (noting that states can play the “trump card” of lax SIPs because they are
“indispensable”).
46. Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 44, at 78-79.
47. See id. at 79-80 (discussing how federal leverage is offset to some extent by “state
capacity,” often leading to negotiated arrangements under which “EPA is more likely to support
failing state programs with additional funding and technical assistance than it is to assume control”).
48. Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9

10

Williams: Toward Regional Governance
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

9/19/2013 2:51 PM

1057

sources in both nonattainment and “clean air” areas.49 Nonetheless, the
nonattainment problem persisted, and when Congress amended the CAA
in 1990, it radically restricted state choices and significantly cabined
EPA’s discretion. 50 The 1990 amendments demand SIP revisions and
specify in extraordinary detail what kinds of control measures states
must select and implement. 51 Of course, the dramatic increase in
federally-prescribed SIP components limits the range of choices
available to affected states. In addition, Congress severely restricted
EPA’s ability to extend the timeframes within which attainment was to
be achieved by the states. 52 These restrictions on SIP program elements
and attainment date extensions severely limited the ability of states to
negotiate with EPA about the timing and extent of control measures.53
Moreover, the 1990 amendments greatly expanded the scope of
federally-prescribed source controls, including emissions limitations for
hazardous air pollutants 54 and controls for pollutants that contribute to
acid deposition. 55 In addition, these sources must now secure operating
permits issued under programs administered by the respective states.56
Overall, and over time, the CAA’s regulatory program has
progressively narrowed the range of discretion states have in fashioning
their own strategies to respond to air quality problems. 57 Congress’s
understandable impatience with the lack of demonstrable progress in
securing more widespread attainment of the NAAQS has led to the
displacement of a program under which EPA and the states enjoyed
considerable discretion in favor of a much more prescriptive program
under which the states’ obligations have become much more ministerial
in nature. 58 As Professor Reitze has concluded, the SIP process—long
49. The revised SIP requirements were codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (clean air areas)
and §§7501-7505 (2006) (nonattainment areas). For a discussion of the 1977 permitting
requirements, see Pedersen, supra note 35, at 1088-93.
50. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481- 86 (2001).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1990).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (1990); see Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2002).
53. Sierra Club, 311 F.3d at 865.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1999).
55. 42 U.S.C §§ 7651-7651o (1990).
56. The permitting program is established in Title V of the 1990 amendments. See 42 U.S.C.
§§7661-7661f (2006). EPA regulations governing state operating permit programs are codified at
40 C.F.R. §§ 70.1 -.12.
57. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 747 n.158, (2006)
(“Congress over time significantly scaled back the scope of state freedom to determine the
appropriate mix of emission controls necessary to meet federal specified environmental
objectives.”).
58. Reitze, Air Quality Protection, supra note 36, at 365.
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thought to be the primary repository of substantial state prerogatives
under the CAA—has become largely “irrelevant” and “may have
outlived its usefulness.” 59
The underlying premises of how state and federal relations under
the CAA are structured have now been seriously eroded. The
consequences are that much of the flexible tailoring for locally diverse
conditions that was contemplated under the original amendments is now
open to serious question. There is also very little room for adaptation
and learning in light of actual experience. And, most importantly, the
objectives of the CAA have been compromised by the institutional
barriers to effective implementation.
Paradoxically, however, there is one area where state interests have
traditionally been, and continue to be, protected under the CAA—
control of interstate transport of air pollutants. It is paradoxical because
it is universally recognized that when it comes to interstate pollution
problems, federal interests should control over state interests.60 The
problem of interstate air pollution has assumed critical importance under
the CAA; it has become apparent that, in the absence of effective limits
on interstate transport of pollutants, many major metropolitan areas
simply cannot attain the NAAQS, particularly for ozone and particulate
matter, without adopting draconian local controls. Indeed, in some
areas, transported pollution is so significant that even the most
aggressive local control strategies will be insufficient to attain the
NAAQS.
The 1977 amendments included “good neighbor” provisions for
addressing interstate air pollution,61 obligating all states to include
source controls in their SIPs to ensure that in-state emissions would not
“prevent attainment or maintenance” of the NAAQS by any other
State. 62 States affected by another state’s failure to abide by this
obligation could petition EPA to enforce it. 63 But the 1977 good
neighbor provisions were notoriously weak. EPA repeatedly refused to
act on complaints from the states about the downwind effects from out-

59. Id.
60. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
61. See Kay M. Crider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64
CH-KENT L. REV. 619, 624 (1988); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 959 (1997) (noting that “no state has secured relief under [the CAA]
for pollution emanating in another state”).
62. Crider, supra note 61, at 624.
63. For a discussion of the pre-1990 CAA provisions governing interstate air pollution and
their implementation by EPA, see id. at 624-38.
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of-state, upwind pollution sources. 64
Congress moved to strengthen the good neighbor provisions and
EPA’s ability to address interstate transport of air pollution in the 1990
amendments to the CAA. Among other things, States must now include
in their SIPs “adequate provisions . . . prohibiting . . . any source or other
type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air
pollutants in amounts that will . . . contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with
respect to any [NAAQS].” 65 In response, EPA embarked on a massive
effort to address interstate pollution on a regional basis. 66 The first step
in this effort was the so-called NOx SIP Call, which imposed mandates
on twenty-two states and the District of Columbia to revise their
respective SIPs to mitigate the interstate transport of ozone. 67 In an
innovative interpretation of the 1990 CAA’s interstate air pollution
provisions, EPA measured a state’s “significant contribution” to
downwind nonattainment problems in part by reference to reductions
achievable through the use of “highly cost-effective controls.” 68 The
agency also designed a regional emissions trading program into which
the affected states could opt as a means of satisfying their good neighbor
obligations. 69 The D.C. Circuit sustained this effort in Michigan v.
EPA, 70 though the regional emissions trading program was not
challenged. 71
Since the NOX Sip Call, EPA’s efforts to develop a regional
solution to interstate ozone air pollution problems have been plagued by
the cooperative federalism structure of the CAA. Paradoxically, while
the overall direction of the CAA has been toward greater reliance on
nationally-prescribed source controls, efforts to address interstate
64. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Air Pollution Control Dist.
of Jefferson Cnty. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); Conneticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2nd
Cir. 1982).
65. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D) (1990). For general discussion of the 1990 amendments
governing interstate air pollution, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE. L.J. 931, 954-56 (1997); Richard Revesz, Federalism and Interstate
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).
PROT.
AGENCY,
66. Clean
Air
Interstate
Rule
(CAIR),
ENVTL.
http://epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/cair/index.html (last visited May 5, 2013).
67. NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call for the Mid-Atlantic States, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd/specprog/NOx/sip_call.htm (last visited May 3, 2013).
68. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For a discussion of the NOx SIP
Call, see Patricia Ross McCubbin, Michigan v. EPA: Interstate Ozone Pollution and EPA’s “NOx
SIP Call”, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47 (2001).
69. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 663.
70. 213 F.3d 663.
71. Id.
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transport of air pollutants has been increasingly stymied by the courts’
insistence that EPA respect and preserve a primary role for the states in
controlling stationary sources.
The first setback came with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in North
Carolina v. EPA. 72 As many metropolitan areas continued to struggle to
meet the NAAQS, EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(“CAIR”) to tighten up restrictions on interstate transport of ozone and
particulate matter pollution. 73 As in the NOX Sip Call, EPA relied in
part on reductions achievable through highly cost effective control
technologies to determine which states contribute significantly to
downwind nonattainment of the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. 74
Like the NOX Sip Call, EPA created a regional emissions trading system
into which consenting states could opt. 75
This time, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected EPA’s regional
approach to interstate air pollution control.76 EPA’s approach in the
CAIR was to employ a region-wide emissions trading program to
determine whether upwind states collectively contributed significantly to
nonattainment in downwind states; in this way, EPA reasoned, the
aggregate levels of reductions needed for downwind states to achieve the
NAAQS could be made in the most cost-effective manner. 77 The effect
of this approach was that, at least in theory, sources in particular states
could avoid making any reductions in their emissions, so long as they
could secure through trading sufficient reductions from other sources
within the region. Through the interstate trading mechanism, the
collective “significant contribution” of upwind sources in the region
could be eliminated, even if an individual state’s contribution was not.78
The court held, however, that the CAA does not permit EPA to act on a
regional basis; instead, any effort by EPA to address the statute’s
requirement that SIPs include measures to ensure that sources “within
the State” do not contribute significantly to downwind nonattainment
must “actually require elimination of emissions from [such] sources.”79
On reconsideration, the court remanded to EPA, but declined to vacate
72. 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
73. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air
Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NO[x] SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg.
25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96).
74. See North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 903.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 907.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 908.
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the CAIR. 80
EPA attempted to respond to the remand by promulgating the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, also known as the Transport Rule. 81 The
rule purported to correct the deficiencies of the CAIR by allocating
control requirements on more state-specific criteria. 82 Nonetheless, the
methodology used by EPA could, in theory, require some states to
reduce emissions to aggregate levels that were below the initial
screening levels used to determine which states should be subject to the
rule’s emission reductions program. 83 That result was a consequence of
EPA’s reliance on “cost-effective controls” for determining what levels
of emissions “significantly contribute” to downwind state
nonattainment. 84 EPA also promulgated FIPs for the states covered by
the Transport Rule, concluding that the covered states had failed to
submit approvable SIPs to meet their good neighbor obligations under
the CAA. 85
The D.C. Circuit in EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 86
vacated and remanded the Transport Rule. The court concluded that the
CAA imposes three sets of constraints on EPA’s authority to control
interstate air pollution spillovers.87 First, the court held that only
emissions “that travel beyond an upwind State’s borders and end up in a
downwind State’s nonattainment area” may be restricted by EPA under
its authority to enforce the good neighbor SIP requirements of the
CAA. 88 Second, the court held that EPA must not only consider the
amount of pollution a particular state sends to a downwind jurisdiction,
but how those absolute amounts of pollution compare with the amounts
sent by other upwind states—a kind of “equitable sharing of burdens”
principle. 89 Finally, the court held that, “to conform to the text of the
statute, EPA must also ensure that the combined obligations of the
various upwind States, as aggregated, do not produce more than
80. Id.
81. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48208 (Aug. 8, 2011).
82. See id. at 48, 211.
83. See EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
84. See id. at 24.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Id. The court concluded that “EPA may not require any upwind State to ‘share the
burden of reducing other upwind states’ emissions. . . . In other words, the statutory text . . .
contains not just an absolute component . . . but also a relative component . . . .” (quoting North
Carolina v. EPC, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
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necessary ‘over-control’ in the downwind States—that is, that the
obligations do not go beyond what is necessary for the downwind States
to achieve the NAAQS.” 90 The end result is that the CAA requires that
“the collective burden [of regional emissions that contribute to
downwind nonattainment] must be allocated among the upwind States in
proportion to the size of their contributions to the downwind State’s
nonattainment,” 91 and must ensure that mandated reductions do not
“yield more downwind air quality benefits than necessary for downwind
areas to attain the NAAQS.” 92 Finding that the Transport Rule did not
conform to these requirements, the D.C. Circuit vacated it and remanded
the matter to EPA. 93
In another important move, the court of appeals in EME Homer
City held that despite the many years of inadequate commitments to
control the export of pollution in the SIPs of upwind states, EPA may
not impose FIPs unless and until the agency first specifies the amount of
“significant contribution” each upwind state must eliminate, gives the
states an opportunity to revise their SIPs to make the necessary
reductions, and the states fail to take the necessary actions to so revise
their respective SIPs. 94 Only then may EPA impose a FIP. 95 In other
words, rather than placing the responsibility on the states in the first
instance to determine if sources within their jurisdictions contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment, and to address such
contributions in their SIPs, EPA must first demonstrate that sources
within a state are contributing to downwind nonattainment and then
precisely identify the extent to which that contribution is deemed to be
significant. On this view, everything depends on EPA’s willingness, and
capacity, to make the first move.
The efforts by EPA to address interstate air pollution dramatically
illustrate the barriers that the cooperative federalism model places in the
way of effective environmental management. The first barrier is that
requiring that interstate-induced nonattainment problems be treated in
highly fine-tuned, pair-wise upwind-downwind state terms dramatically
limits EPA’s ability to fashion efficient, cost-effective solutions to
interstate pollution problems. This approach stands in marked contrast
to the other authority EPA enjoys under the CAA to impose categorical
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 18
Id. at 31.
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emissions limitations on local sources, regardless whether such limits
may, in theory, result in more emissions reductions than are necessary to
attain the NAAQS. This result seems to turn federalism principles on
their head, empowering national authority to regulate heavily in cases
that seem to involve only local air quality problems, but tightly
constraining national authority to address interstate air quality problems.
The second barrier to effective environmental management in the
existing institutional arrangements relates to the procedural complexities
associated with addressing interstate pollution problems. Initial SIP
development occurs at the state level, in which affected out-of-state
interests are not represented and have no effective voice. In theory,
affected downwind interests may object to inadequate protection of their
interests when EPA conducts rulemaking to review the SIPs submitted
by upwind states. There is, however, a distinct set of problems
associated with making these participation rights effective.
First, state SIPs are primarily focused on attaining the NAAQS in
the AQCRs within the state. As a consequence, the air quality modeling
used to demonstrate the SIP’s adequacy will not necessarily, and
typically does not, consider extra-jurisdictional effects. Indeed, the
court’s decision in EME Homer City strongly suggests that states simply
have no obligation to consider such effects in the SIP development
process unless and until EPA directs the state to reduce emissions from
specific sources (or groups of sources) by a specific amount. 96
Accordingly, any downwind state’s objection to a SIP before EPA will
have to be supported by additional evidence demonstrating that the SIP
does not adequately address the upwind state’s “significant contribution”
to downwind nonattainment.
Second, while EPA may in theory rely on evidence submitted in the
SIP approval process to support an objection from downwind states, the
agency will also have to quantify the reductions the state must achieve in
order to satisfy the state’s good neighbor obligations. This may work
tolerably well if the interstate air quality problem is bi-lateral, involving
only one upwind and one downwind state, respectively. But it is
doubtful that there are many interstate air quality problems of this type;
indeed, the recent evidence is that interstate air quality problems are
multi-lateral and regional in scope, involving many upwind and
downwind states. In these circumstances, under North Carolina and
EME Homer City, the cleanup burdens associated with multi-state air
quality problems must be allocated among the upwind states in an
96.
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equitable manner.97 There will thus be the need for a separate
rulemaking in which all affected states may participate. In short, in the
absence of prior “significant contribution” findings by EPA, downwind
states have no effective mechanism for challenging a particular state’s
proposed SIP. The procedural complexities and costs associated with
addressing interstate air quality problems thus make effective air quality
management extraordinarily difficult under current institutional
arrangements.
B.

The Clean Water Act and the Growth of State Authority

Like the CAA, the CWA is modeled on a cooperative federalism
basis, in which regulatory responsibilities are divided between EPA and
the states. The heart of the CWA is section 301(a), which prohibits
unpermitted discharges of pollutants from point sources into “navigable
waters.” 98 The CWA establishes two permitting systems. The National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), established under
Section 402, applies to all point source discharges of all pollutants, 99
except “dredged and fill material.” Point source discharges of dredged
and fill material are subject to a separate program established under
Section 404. 100 The NPDES is administered by EPA while the Section
404 program is jointly administered by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. 101
EPA may delegate the administration of either or both of these
permit programs to States with approved programs. 102 Delegations
under Section 402 are often referred to as State Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“SPDES”) programs, and nearly all of the States
have chosen to administer such programs. 103 Delegations under Section
404, by contrast, are much more limited in scope. Section 404(g)

97. See North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
99. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(holding that EPA lacks “authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit
requirements of § 402”).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1987).
101. See Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An
Overview in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 8-9 (Kim Diana
Connolly et al. eds. 2005); see also Section 404 Permitting, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis (last visited May 3, 2013).
102. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g) (2000).
103. For a list of states with approved State NPDES programs, see
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm.
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reserves exclusive jurisdiction for the federal government over
discharges of dredged and fill material into what are commonly known
as “traditional navigable waters” and wetlands adjacent to such
waters. 104 In part due to the limited scope of section 404 delegations,
only two states, Michigan and New Jersey, administer permit programs
approved under Section 404. 105
Permits issued under the EPA-administered NPDES program or by
a state-administered SPDES programs must incorporate technologybased effluent limitations. 106 These limitations are promulgated by EPA
on a categorical, industry-wide basis and are subject to revision at fiveAs originally conceived, the technology-based
year intervals. 107
standards were to be implemented in stages of increasing stringency,
culminating in a requirement that all point sources be subject to effluent
limitations based on the “best available technology.” 108 The overall goal
of the CWA was to eliminate point source discharges completely by
1985 109 through progressively more stringent technology-forcing federal
regulations. 110
The basic assumption of the original CWA was that strict,
nationally-promulgated categorical limitations on all discharges from
point sources would perform yeoman’s work to the end of restoring and
maintaining “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” 111 Short of that, it was expected that the regulatory
program for point sources would achieve an “interim goal” of
“fishable/swimmable” water quality (i.e., “water quality which provides
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water”) by 1983. 112 Under these
104. R.von Oppenfeld, State Roles in the Implementation of the Section 404 Program, in
WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 322-25 (Kim Diane Connolly, et al.
eds, 2005).
105. See id. at 322-25. More information on state assumption of Section 404 permitting
authority is available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact23.cfm. For discussion of
why few states have chosen to assume such responsibilities, see Oliver A. Houck & Michael
Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act
Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242 (1995).
106. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1342(b)(1)(B) (2000). For an overview of the permitting
process and its requirements, see Office of Wastewater Management: Water Permitting 101, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/101pape.pdf (last visited May 5, 2013).
107. 33 U.S.C. §1311 (1995); see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
115-116 (1977).
108. See Andreen, supra note 4, at 548.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1991).
110. Id.
111. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1991) (stating objectives of CWA).
112. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1991).
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assumptions, the role of states in the overall implementation of the
CWA, while significant, was largely limited to implementing nationallypromulgated point source controls.
The CWA’s confidence in the point source control program was,
however, hedged. The CWA does include a “safety net” to backstop any
shortcomings that may be experienced in the implementation of
technology-based point source controls. 113 The Act requires that more
stringent effluent limitations be fashioned if necessary to meet water
quality standards. 114 This safety net was expected to perform a limited
and interstitial role, plugging some leaks in the (expected) shortcomings
of the more prescriptive regulatory program. Nonetheless, the reality
now is that the water quality safety net drives the regulatory program. 115
Its role is neither occasional nor interstitial; it is pervasive and primary.
Implementation of the water quality standards is almost entirely
dependent on the states. A brief overview explains why. First, the
CWA relies on the states to establish water quality standards, subject to
EPA oversight. 116 The standards may vary in stringency from one water
segment to another and within the same segment as it flows from one
jurisdiction into another.117 The varying stringency is a function of the
discretion states have over two required elements of water quality
standards: “use designations” and “water quality criteria.”118 As to uses,
the CWA does create a presumptive regulatory floor—the
fishable/swimmable goal. 119 The floor may be lowered, however, in
some circumstances—namely, a demonstration by the state that the
presumptive floor cannot be attained without, among other things,
113. See E.P.A. v. CA ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976)
(describing water quality standards as “a supplementary basis . . . to prevent water quality from
falling below acceptable levels”). See generally, PERCIVAL, supra note 14, at 714-15 (describing
water quality standards as “a ‘safety net’ to back up the technology-based controls on which the
[CWA] primarily relies”).
114. See 33 U.S.C. §1312(a) (1987).
115. See Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Bezel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the
Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 99, 135 (2010) [hereinafter Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean
Water Act] infra note 132 (noting that the “[t]he statutory safety net—in the form of state water
quality standards—has . . . taken on a larger role”).
116. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)-(b). The state role in establishing water quality standards is
discussed in detail in Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, 209-15.
117. See Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 213 (“[T]he
system of ambient standards established under the CWA is characterized by considerable variation
among the states, even those in the same geographic region with similar or identical environmental
conditions, and even those that share a single interstate water body.”).
118. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1983).
119. See id. at § 1251(a)(2).
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“substantial and widespread economic and social impact”120—a
“feasibility-limited” approach that is noticeably absent from the ambient
air quality floors established by the CAA.
The second constitutive element of water quality standards—water
quality criteria—also vests in the states a large measure of flexibility.
EPA does play a role here, but is limited to issuing non-binding
guidelines and ensuring that the criteria chosen by the states are
adequate to support designated uses. 121 Uncertainties in the relationship
between ambient concentrations of particular pollutants and impacts on
designated uses, particularly with respect to toxic water pollutants, open
a very large space for state discretion. 122
The CWA contemplated that state promulgated water quality
standards would be implemented in a couple of different ways.
Primarily, the act authorized EPA to tighten effluent limitations on point
sources to meet the water quality standards, but this approach was not
mandatory and EPA has ignored it. 123 The procedure for imposing more
stringent water-quality-based limitations on point sources obligated EPA
to examine the relationship between the costs and benefits of such
heightened restrictions, a process that is both cumbersome and would be
difficult for EPA to defend in court. 124 This approach to implementing
water quality standards never took hold and, in fact, has been
abandoned. 125
The states’ role in protecting water quality is underscored by the
CWA’s alternative mechanisms implementing, or at least respecting,
state water quality standards. Section 401 of the CWA requires that
applicants for federal permits or licenses (other than state-issued CWA
120. See 40 C.F.R. 131.10(g)(6) (1983). Allowable variances from the “fishable/swimmable”
standard must be based on a “use attainability analysis.” For discussion, see Missouri Coalition for
the Env’t v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 903, 905 (W.D. Mo. 2012).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000).
122. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993)
(upholding deferential EPA review of state water quality criteria).
123. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 527, 551-52 (2005).
124. See id. (describing procedures to impose more stringent water-quality-based standards on
point sources); Robert L. Glicksman, & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, and Law, and the Arc
of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark,
32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 99, 119-20 (2010) (noting that “[w]ater quality standards . . . often
cannot be translated into effluent limitations that are defendable in court tests”).
125. See Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, supra note 30, at 55
(concluding that “EPA has entirely failed to implement Section 302 of CWA, providing for pointsource effluent limitations beyond those required to meet federal technology-based requirements
and state water quality standards, rendering it a dead letter”).
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discharge permits) that may result in jurisdictional discharges obtain a
certification from the appropriate state that the discharge will not, among
The
other things, violate applicable water quality standards.126
certifying state may impose specific measures to ensure that state water
quality standards are not violated by the federally-permitted activity and
these measures become a condition to be included in the federal permit
or license. 127 Absent such certification, or a state’s waiver of
certification, federal agencies must deny the requested permit or
license. 128
In contrast to the procedure for imposing more stringent waterquality-based effluent limitations on point sources in CWA discharge
permits, the water quality certification procedures for other federal
permits and licenses have been in some cases aggressively enforced by
the states. 129 Moreover, the certification operates like a reverse
“preemption” mechanism, in which federal permitting authorities must
abide by state certification decisions, with no effective federal forum
available to the agency or the permit applicant to challenge certification
decisions deemed to be unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.130
The role for the states in the CWA’s regulatory program is most
evident, and most ineffective, when the forms of water pollution that
currently present the largest threat to achieving water quality objectives
are considered. By now, it is widely accepted that “non-point source
pollution has evolved into the largest single obstacle to improving water
quality.” 131 Indeed, non-point source pollution is estimated to be the
principal culprit in over three-quarters of all lakes and rivers that fail to
meet water quality standards.132 Although EPA has some indirect
influence on control of non-point source pollution by virtue of the
Section 303(d) “total maximum daily loads” program, 133 it lacks any
ability to directly regulate most forms of this water quality

126. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1977).
127. Id. § 1341(d).
128. Id. § 1341(a).
129. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
130. See Lake Carriers Ass’n v. E.P.A., 652 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (federal agency does
not have authority to challenge or alter conditions imposed by certifying state; challenge to such
conditions may be had in state court); Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
131. See Andreen, supra note 4.
132. See Glicksman & Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act,
supra note 115, at 132.
133. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); Guidelines for Reviewing
TMDLs Under Existing Regulations Issued in 1992, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/final52002.cfm (last visited May 5, 2013).
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impairment. 134 Non-point source pollution is principally the result of
land use practices, such as urbanization and agricultural, silvicultural,
and mining practices that are traditionally governed by state and local
law. These practices are currently beyond the reach of direct national
regulatory authority under the CWA. The CWA addresses non-point
source pollution primarily through planning requirements supported by
federal funding, but is largely limited to whatever measures the states
may choose to adopt. 135 EPA has authority to approve or disapprove
these plans, but has no authority to promulgate a plan of its own when
states refuse to submit a plan or submit one that fails to meet statutory
requirements. 136 Most states have not imposed enforceable controls on
non-point source pollution, but instead have relied on voluntary
measures and local government authority. 137
General assessments of the performance of the CWA conclude that
the structural limitations of the CWA, particularly the absence of
effective authority to control non-point source pollution, remain the
greatest obstacle to achieving the legislation’s goal of “restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” 138 There is, moreover, widespread recognition that
effective measures to improve water quality will require planning and
assessment at the watershed, rather than water segment, level. 139 The
state-centered approach of the CWA to water quality improvements
hampers effective watershed management by deferring to a patchwork of
inconsistent, and often inadequate, standards and management
techniques. 140
134.
135.

See Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 226-30.
See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 30-31 (2nd ed. 2002); see also Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, IncentiveBased Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Non-Point Source Water
Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 21, 67-78 (discussing CWA planning requirements for nonpoint source pollution) [hereinafter Williams, When Voluntary Controls Fail].
136. See Williams, When Voluntary Controls Fail, supra note 135, at 74.
137. See id. at 72-73.
138. See, e.g., Williams F. Pedersen, Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69, 94 (1988) (noting that “[n]onpoint and water quality control authorities . . . are absent from the
Clean Water Act”); Robert Adler, Resilience, Restoration and Sustainability: Revisiting the
Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 139, 159-162 (2010)
(discussing the CWA’s ineffective regulation of non-point source pollution); Andreen, supra note 4,
592-93 (discussing problem of non-point source pollution).
PROT.
AGENCY,
139. See
A
Watershed
Approach,
ENVTL.
www.epa.gov/type/watersheds/approach.cfm (last visited May 5, 2013); see also Robert W. Adler,
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973 (1995).
140. See Adler, Addressing Barriers, supra note 140, at 991-95; see also Murchison, supra
note 123, 594-96.
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Problems of Coordination, Disruption, and Resiliency Under the
CAA and CWA

In addition to the problems discussed above, the cooperative
federalism model of the CAA and CWA also suffers from more general
problems of coordination, disruption, and lack of resiliency. State
responsibilities under the respective programs are often dependent on
first moves by EPA, as the EME Homer City decision highlights. 141 Yet,
in many cases, EPA’s program responsibilities are fragmented in ways
that make overall coordination difficult. Consider the CAA. In addition
to SIP requirements, attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS may be
significantly affected by federally-promulgated emissions limitations on
a variety of mobile and stationary sources and, most significantly, by
revisions to the NAAQS themselves. In a very real sense, the SIP
planning process may be directed at a moving target. As a consequence,
EPA faces serious problems in coordinating its rulemaking
responsibilities under the CAA’s various air quality programs to ensure
that the SIP process does not break down or become subject to excessive
delays and high transaction costs.
The experience of EPA’s efforts to address interstate air pollution
highlight just how difficult and complex this coordination problem can
be. Downwind states that are dependent on EPA’s efforts to restrict
emissions from upwind sources may find themselves left with
inadequate SIPs when EPA’s efforts fail, and thus may face an
obligation to revise their SIPs to include very costly and unpopular
control measures that are needed to address continuing threats to public
health and welfare. Many states may simply balk at making such
revisions and will likely receive a sympathetic hearing before EPA.142
Upwind states, likewise, may be understandably reluctant to undertake
SIP revisions for fear that EPA may promulgate rules that alter
regulatory requirements. The serious “moving target” quality about the
EPA-SIP revision process at the least adds significant transactions costs
to the regulatory program and diverts resources from more meaningful
regulatory efforts.
The coordination problem becomes considerably more pronounced
when the field is enlarged to consider the program responsibilities of
141. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
142. For some examples of such sympathy by EPA, see Williams, Cooperative Federalism,
supra note 23, at 91-95.
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EPA that are scattered throughout the CAA. Consider a straightforward
example. EPA revisions to an existing NAAQS trigger the states’
obligation to develop and submit revised SIPs. During the same period,
EPA may also be conducting or considering other rulemakings. These
parallel rulemakings may directly affect the requirements to which the
SIPs must conform or indirectly affect the pollution control strategies
from which the states may choose. For example, EPA may promulgate
or be in the process of promulgating rules imposing stricter emissions
limitations on new motor vehicles, or rules requiring significant
reductions in emissions of hazardous air pollutants—many of which are
precursors of or contributors to ambient levels of criteria pollutants such
as ozone or particulate matter. The new rules may significantly alter the
amount of emissions reductions states may have to eke out of other,
existing sources, often at very high costs, to demonstrate that their SIP
measures will attain the revised NAAQS. Alternatively, the new rules
may be the necessary, critical piece in an overall control strategy that
can be demonstrated to push an area into attainment. The EPA’s ability
to manage the timing of its rulemaking responsibilities clearly may
dramatically impact the timing and content of state SIP revisions.
Another, often under-appreciated factor that complicates the CAA’s
institutional structure is also highlighted by the EME Homer City
decision. 143 That factor is the disruptive effect on program development
and implementation occasioned by the provision for judicial review. 144
Judicial reversal or remand of EPA rules can have a substantial,
program-wide effect on existing SIPs and the need for SIP revisions. In
some cases, of course, a judicial remand may simply require EPA to take
minor corrective action that can be completed within reasonably short
periods of time. 145 In other cases, however, the basis for a judicial
remand may require the agency to rethink its entire approach to a
particular rulemaking task or to abandon it completely. 146 The affected
states may again become obligated to revise their SIP, exposing the
States and EPA to another round of expensive, time-consuming
rulemakings. In addition, many of EPA’s rulemaking responsibilities
are non-discretionary in character and may be enforced by the courts at

143. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 25 (dissent).
144. See Paul S. Weiland & Robert O. Vos, Reforming EPA’s Organizational Structure:
Establishing an Adaptable Agency Through Eco-Regions, 42 NAT. RES. J. 91, 107-09 (2002)
(discussing effect of litigation on EPA’s implementation of environmental laws).
145. See Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizens Suits to Enforce NonDiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 358 (2004).
146. Id.
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the behest of interested citizens. 147 These judicial mandates may divert
EPA resources from other responsibilities, some of which may be related
to SIP requirements or the SIP approval process. 148
Along with the disruption to overall programmatic objectives,
judicial reversal also highlights the lack of resiliency in the cooperative
federalism structure of our major environmental programs. Of course,
judicial review may disrupt program implementation regardless whether
the program is modeled under a cooperative federalism approach or
otherwise. Nonetheless, the disruptive effect of judicial review under
the cooperative federalism model may be much more pronounced, at
least in terms of national programmatic effects, because of the
interdependence of the working parts of the program. Put another way,
the cooperative federalism model lacks resiliency in the face of major
program disruptions like judicial reversal of EPA rules.
II. TO CENTRALIZE OR DECENTRALIZE: WHY FEDERALISM IS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE FRAME
From the very beginnings of the environmental movement, there
has been considerable interest in large structural issues pertaining to the
institutional design of regulatory programs. This is particularly true with
respect to issues concerning how regulatory authority for environmental
protection should be allocated in our federal system of government.
Indeed, the sub-field of “environmental federalism” has generated
volumes of work and spawned numerous conferences and symposia. In
the legal scholarly literature, for years the issue was, and to some extent
still is, dominated by a constrained set of structural choices. Doubtless
due to the constitutional status of the states and the national government,
the choices seemed to be limited to a highly centralized national
regulatory program or a decentralized and diverse set of programs
administered by the states, or some admixture of the two. In short,
“federalism” and the ghost of dual sovereignty have had a profound and
ubiquitous effect on our thinking about the appropriate shape of our
environmental laws.
Richard Stewart significantly shaped the terms of debate,
147. Citizen initiated litigation has had dramatic effects on the shape of our environmental
programs. For an overview, see Glicksman, The Value of Agency, supra note 146; see also Barton
H. Thomson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing Innovation in Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000).
148. On the manner in which litigation disrupts and reorients EPA’s priorities, see generally
ROSEMARY O’LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA (1993); SKIP
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983).
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explaining with care why it is necessary to have some mix of federal and
state regulatory authority to address the diverse character of
environmental problems and politics.149 Stewart observed that our
political traditions have presumed a principle of subsidiarity; highly
decentralized, state-centered allocation of regulatory authority for
environmental protection is the presumptive norm. 150 Departures from
that norm—in the form of exertions of national regulatory power—
require some measure of justification.151
The bases for this presumption are by now familiar. There is the
argument from utilitarianism: decentralized decision-making is more
likely than nationally uniform regulation to regulate in ways that reflect
“geographical variations in preferences for collective goods like
environmental quality.” 152 Moreover, even when there is widespread
agreement on the environmental objectives to be pursued, decentralized
decision-making is likely to be more cost-effective because it can
account for local environmental conditions and harness local knowledge
in ways that centralized decision-making cannot. 153 Then there is the
argument from innovation and adaptive learning: decentralized
regulatory structures may serve as policy laboratories, experimenting
with varying degrees of environmental quality and ways to achieve
them, resulting in a richly diverse national portfolio of policies and
environments, as well as transferable technical and social knowledge.154
149. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice?]. On the significance of Professor Stewart’s contributions, see David E.
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1803 (2008) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive
Federalism] (“Early scholarship followed a framework set forth by Richard Stewart.”).
150. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211. On the principle of
subsidiarity in environmental governance, see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 130, 134-35 (2005).
151. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211.
152. Id. at 1210.
153. See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 150, at 136-37.
154. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211. For the classic statement
of how the states can serve as “laboratories” for policy development, see New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[It] is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). See also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “allows for more innovation
and experimentation in government”). For a classic theoretical account casting doubt on the thesis
that federalism promotes experimentation and innovation, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980). For a
more recent skeptical view of the thesis, see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009).
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Finally, there is the argument from democracy and community that
decentralized structures promote greater measures of active civic
engagement and democratic accountability. 155
Stewart also provided a menu of factors that alone or in
combination warrant departures from the presumptive norm. 156 First,
decentralization, and the diversity of policies it fosters, may introduce a
dynamic of competition among jurisdictions seeking to retain or attract
mobile capital investment.157 This dynamic may bear the structure of a
classic prisoners’ dilemma game, or a “tragedy of the commons,” in
which the individually rational actions of each jurisdiction yield a
collectively irrational result. 158 The result is a “race-to-the-bottom,” in
which competing states will enforce only lax environmental standards in
an effort to attract and retain mobile capital investment. 159 The logic and
empirical verification of the “race” remain hotly contested.160
National approaches to environmental management may also be
warranted when they yield important economies of scale for some
critical regulatory tasks, particularly those involving “recurring,
technically complex, issues.” 161 While diverse local conditions can
stymie desirable environmental outcomes when excessively uniform
regulatory measures are employed, there are nonetheless basic questions
the answers to which are not entirely dependent on local conditions.
Providing a more centralized authority for developing and disseminating
transferable information and technologies can significantly reduce the
costs of environmental regulation by eliminating duplicative, redundant

155. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1210.
156. Id. at 1211.
157. Id. at 1211-12.
158. Id. at 1211-12.
159. The “race-to-the bottom” rationale for federal regulation finds voice in several Supreme
Court decisions involving the scope of national power. See, e.g.,United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
160. Richard Revesz, for example, concludes that there is no theoretical basis for concluding
that competition among jurisdictions will take on the structure of a prisoners’ dilemma game instead
of more standard models of competition that yield an equilibrium state in which social welfare is
maximized. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Raceto-the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L.REV.1210, 1242
(1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition]. For additional criticism of the
race-to-the-the-bottom theory, see Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
12-18 (2002). Professor Engel, by contrast, has argued that the available empirical evidence, while
not conclusive, supports the application of game theoretic models, which predict a race-to-the
problem. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race” and Is It
“to-the-Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 351 (1997).
161. See Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 161, at 1212.
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analysis. 162
Other collective action problems, particularly the high transaction
costs that hamper effective representation of environmental interests at
the state and local levels, may explain local willingness to sacrifice
environmental quality to retain or attract investment, and may also
warrant departures from a broadly decentralized structure of regulatory
authority. 163 Like the predicted race-to-the-bottom, the theory that
decentralized policy-making is more likely than centralized policymaking to be distorted by collective action problems is more a point for
argument than proven insight.
Stewart also suggested that national regulation may be preferable to
more decentralized regulatory options because it may be more conducive
to securing popular commitment to positive environmental change in the
face of significant costs.164 Stewart posited that “[n]ational mechanisms
for determining environmental policies facilitate, to a greater degree than
their state and local counterparts, the achievement of commitments
entailing material sacrifice. . . . Communities no less than individuals
may be far more willing to undertake sacrifices for a common ideal if
there are effective assurances that others are making sacrifices too.”165
The vast literature on norm formation and enforcement, through both
informal and formal mechanisms, however, shows that pride of “place,”
as much as abstract commitments to national ideals, can often drive
positive environmental change. That is not to say that Stewart got it
wrong. Instead, counterexamples simply demonstrate that shared
commitments to pursue environmental objectives in the face of personal
sacrifice are dependent on a host of variables such as context, effective
leadership, and the particular issues to be addressed. These variables
may favor decentralized regulatory structures in some cases and more
centralized structures in others.
There is little disagreement, however, that Professor Stewart got it
right when he argued that national regulation is warranted in the face of
interstate “spillovers” or externalities.166 As Professors Adelman and
Engel explain, the argument for federal regulation in the presence of
interstate spillovers “begins with a simple insight: regulation would be
inefficient if its costs and benefits were not fully internalized by the
162. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 61415 (1996); see also Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 145-50.
163. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1213-15.
164. Id. at 1214-15.
165. Id. at 1217.
166. Id.
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regulating authority.” 167 The apparent agreement on principle has,
however, spawned robust debate on application.
The idea that jurisdictional authority should align geographically
with the scope of environmental problems has become known as the
“Matching Principle.” 168 This principle, coined by Professors Butler and
Macey, can be stated simply: “the size of the geographic area affected by
a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate
governmental level for responding to the pollution. There is no need for
the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity.” 169
Where federal regulation addresses activities that have only local effects,
there is a “jurisdictional mismatch.”170 Most of the advocates of the
mismatch theory invoke federalism principles as a basis for favoring
state over national regulatory authority for most environmental
problems. 171
More recent environmental federalism scholarship has extolled the
virtues of cooperative federalism and its opportunities for overlapping
regulatory authority, noting that it can foster greater possibilities for
“dynamic” or “adaptive” regulatory systems, in which allocations of
authority are more fluid and responsive to larger contextual
circumstances. 172 As Professor Buzbee puts it: “Not only are state and
federal interactions dynamic at any point in time, with regulators
interacting in myriad ways, but they each will change in response to the
actions of the other, to changing environmental circumstances and,
especially, to the ever-changing political climate.”173 This dynamism
can lead to important innovations that may bubble up from the bottom
rather than trickle down from the top. 174 Others have advocated for
“multi-scalar” 175 or “modal” 176 institutional arrangements in which
federal and state power is exercised at different levels or scales and/or in
a variety of collaborative forms.
167. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1803.
168. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).
169. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).
170. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 150,, at 130.
171. See id. at 132; see also Butler & Macey, supra note 169, at 27-28.
172. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108,
112 (2005).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Hari M. Ososfksy, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009).
176. See Freeman & Farber, supra note 5.
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The “matching principle” scholarship and “dynamic” or “adaptive”
federalism scholarship share a basic commitment to federalism as an
organizing principle. Yet, aside from some basic constitutional and
historical arrangements, it is not at all apparent why federalism should
be either the starting or ending point for discussions of appropriate
institutional arrangements. Indeed, arguments for a greater state or
national presence in particular areas of environmental management, or in
environmental law generally, tend to posed within an artificially
constrained set of institutional choices. The federalism debate is poised
in a landscape of false choices: nationally uniform regulation or diverse
state-centered regulation, or some mixture of the two.
The false choices posed by federalism-dominated discussions of
appropriate institutional arrangements are based on the failure to
recognize a distinction between decentralized regulatory authority and
federalism. 177 Concerns about “jurisdictional mismatch” or institutional
scale are not really so much about federalism, but instead are arguments
about the appropriate degree of centralization of regulatory functions.
However, “decentralization” may be understood more simply as “a
managerial concept; it refers to the delegation of centralized authority to
subordinate units of either a geographic or functional character. . . .” 178
The appropriate degree of decentralization is not, or not necessarily, a
question about respecting constitutional allocations of authority, but
instead a question about how to “achieve effective management.” 179
Decentralization may promote effective management because a
subordinate agent, “who is relatively close to the subject matter will be
more knowledgeable, more responsive, and more involved than a higher
ranking person ensconced in some distant central office.” 180
The traditional idea of federalism, by contrast, is not in principle
about managerial choice concerning the most effective way to achieve
particular policy goals; rather, federalism is about the constitutional
scope of managerial authority, or put in different terms, about the scope
of the states’ rights of “exit” (i.e., the right of states to resist federal
policy choices and put in place policies more to their own liking). 181 On
177. See Cross, The Folly of Federalism, supra note 161, at 18 (“The most serious flaw in
federalism scholarship . . . is the false conflation of federalism with decentralization.”); see also
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903, 910 (1994) (noting a need to “distinguish federalism from decentralization”).
178. Rubin & Feely, supra note 178, at 910.
179. Id. See also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO THE
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
180. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 177, at 910.
181. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term – Foreword: Federalism All the
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this view, the instrumental benefits of the decentralization that
federalism provides, while welcome, are largely beside the point; when
acting within its protected sphere of autonomy, a state may make even
atrociously bad policy judgments—however defined—without fear of
federal interference. A federalism-based system of environmental
regulation would, accordingly, involve judgments not about the
appropriate degree of centralization, such as those advanced under the
“jurisdictional mismatch” thesis. Nor would it involve discussion about
the myriad ways in which states could contribute to overall program
effectiveness, such as those found in the “adaptive” or “dynamic”
federalism literature. Less still would it concern itself with various sorts
of collective action problems that may hamper the voices of diverse and
important constituencies or stakeholders. Instead, it would involve
discussion about the points of exit that the states, by virtue of their
constitutional status, enjoy—the points at which the states “may make
policy in accord with their own preferences, separate and apart from the
center,” or national authority. 182
I do not mean to suggest that the predominate forms of a weaker
notion of “federalism” —ones that endorse “institutional arrangements
[that] promote voice, not exit; integration, not autonomy;
interdependence, not independence” 183—should be abandoned or
ignored. To the contrary, to the extent that this kind of “federalism”
promotes values associated with decentralization, they should serve as
appropriate points of discussion about overall institutional arrangements
for environmental management. For example, regardless of the degree
to which national authority is decentralized, it may still be worthwhile to
provide opportunities for states to regulate environmental conditions
concurrently with the national government by limiting the circumstances
in which federal law will be deemed to preempt state law.184 By the
same token, one should not let the “ghost of sovereignty” that pervades
and often informs these weaker versions of federalism stand in the way
of securing the values that other forms of decentralization may better
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2010) (describing traditional views of federalism as based on
sovereignty “which formally guarantees a state’s power to rule without interference over a
policymaking domain of its own”) [hereinafter, Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down]; see also
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, supra note 45, at 1258 (describing views of
federalism).
182. Id. at 7.
183. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 181, at 7.
184. See Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1832-49 (arguing that
presumptions against preemption will promote dynamic and adaptive forms of environmental
regulation).
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promote. 185
It is also important not to let the presumptive
decentralization that federalism by definition promotes cloud our
thinking about the kind of decentralization that will promote effective
environmental management.
Viewed from this perspective, the cooperative federalism model
that has been so heavily relied upon by Congress in the design of our
major environmental programs, such as the CAA and CWA, should be
assessed not in terms of federalism principles, but instead as a
managerial decision about the appropriate degree of centralization and
decentralization in our environmental programs. After all, it is doubtful
that the degree to which federalism infects current environmental law is
constitutionally compelled. In the case of the CAA and CWA, in
particular, nearly all the elements of these statutory programs may be
implemented directly by the federal government should the states fail to
act. As such, these programs should be open to criticism for their
failures to advance the very values that pivot around assessments of
overall program design—values such as effectiveness and efficiency in
achieving overall program objectives, overcoming collective action
problems that may stymie robust participation in program
implementation by affected stakeholders, and overall responsiveness to
public preferences. In my view, the shortcomings in our current
environmental programs along these vectors argue powerfully for
thinking about alternative institutional arrangements—ones that give
appropriate consideration to federalism values but are not slavishly
yoked to those values.
From a managerial perspective, there is no reason to believe that the
federalism-based form of decentralization that shapes our environmental
laws enhances the overall effectiveness of those laws. The scope of
environmental problems rarely, if ever, coincides neatly with the
otherwise arbitrary lines on the map that demarcate the jurisdictional
limits of state authority. Nor is there any reason to believe that the
variable local conditions that might support variation in overall program
policies and priorities can be mapped along state jurisdictional
boundaries. 186 In fact, the intra-national variation experienced in our
current, federalism-based approach seems to be more the product of the
respective states’ inclination to favor economic investment over
environmental protection; variation in local environmental conditions
185. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 181, at 11-33 (discussing how the
“ghost of sovereignty” haunts thinking about federalism and institutional arrangements).
186. See Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 216 (concluding that “the states are not ideally matched
to the task [of ecosystem management] either territorially or in terms of institutional capacities”).
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seems to have little or no influence on the extent or shape of this
variation. 187
Stewart pragmatically understood that the federal government’s
dependence on the states had severely compromised the effectiveness of
our environmental laws. 188 He pointedly argued that the problems
associated with that dependence “could be alleviated if federal officials
were empowered to require or induce local officials” to adhere more
strictly to federal requirements.189
Before more effective forms of decentralization can be imagined,
one must first move beyond federalism-based forms of decentralization.
One promising alternative that may overcome this federalism-based
dependence, little explored in the scholarly literature, is to situate
environmental management within semi-autonomous regional entities,
rather than in states. Of course, regional environmental management is
not itself a new idea; there are numerous examples of it currently in
place. 190 For the most part, however, these institutions take the form of
interstate compacts or advisory entities with little or no authority to
make policy with binding legal effect and virtually no authority that
extends beyond a particular environmental medium, such as a nationally
significant body of water like Lake Tahoe 191 or the Chesapeake Bay. 192
Similarly, the scale of these institutions is often based on a specific
environmental target, such as water quality, and is not likely suitable for
addressing multi-media environmental problems.
What I am suggesting is fundamentally different. I propose that
federal regulatory authority be allocated to relatively autonomous
regional institutions—call them “Regional Environmental Management
Agencies” (“REMAs”), vested with regulatory authority roughly

187. See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 129 (noting that “when states make policy alone,
they are generally more in tune with economic investment than with environmental protection”).
188. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1196.
189. Id.
190. For some prominent examples, see Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed
Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379 (2000) [hereinafter Cannon, Choices
and Institutions in Watershed Management] (discussing the Chesapeake Bay Program, a
collaborative, three-state regional program to improve water quality in the Chesapeake Bay);
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54 (2005) (discussing regional climate change programs, such as the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which involves seven states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions);
Matthew McKinney et al., Regionalism in the West: An Inventory and Assessment, 23 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 101 (2002) (listing regional arrangements in the western United States).
191. See Mark T. Imperial & Derek Kauneckis, Moving from Conflict to Collaboration:
Watershed Governance in Lake Tahoe, 43 NAT. RES. J. 1009 (2003).
192. See Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, supra note 191.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9

34

Williams: Toward Regional Governance
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

9/19/2013 2:51 PM

TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

1081

equivalent to, but in important ways more extensive than, the authority
currently exercised by EPA. This robust regional authority would,
however, be limited in scope to, and appropriately tailored for, distinct
sub-national geographic regions. 193 These REMAs would be federal
agencies vested with delegated national power, but constrained within
sub-national, regionally-defined jurisdictional limits.
The idea that national power may be divided and allocated among
regionally-based agencies seems not to have entered conversations
concerning “environmental federalism” in any significant way. 194 To be
sure, there have been discussions about “hybrid regional institutions,”
that draw upon and utilize the pre-existing regulatory authority of the
states and national government, 195 but these institutions have been ad
hoc and unstable, and therefore lack clear regulatory authority and
program continuity. Likewise, there are occasional references in the
scholarly literature to the desirability of regional approaches to
environmental management, but little in the way of actual proposals for
regionally- based regulatory authority. 196 I believe it is time to give
regional governance a more concrete and stable institutional foundation.
In the next section, I begin to sketch out the basic institutional
arrangements underlying a regional approach to environmental
management and why these arrangements may yield significant
improvements in our ability to manage environmental problems in a
responsive, effective, and efficient manner.
III. TOWARD REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE.
As described in Section I of this article, the current institutional
arrangements under the CAA and CWA hamper effective environmental
regulation in a number of ways, and do not yield productive policy
variation that one may expect from an appropriately decentralized
regulatory system. In terms of the CAA, the SIP process no longer
delivers in any significant way the benefits of decentralized regulatory
193. The regional approach I endorse in this article bears a family resemblance to the “new
regionalism” approaches that have been proposed to deal with problems associated with the
fragmentation of regulatory authority in major metropolitan areas, but operates at a larger
geographic scale. For a critical evaluation of the “new regionalism,” see Lisa T. Alexander, The
Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 629 (2011).
194. For a notable exception, see Weiland & Vos, supra note 144.
195. See, e.g, Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 217-22.
196. See, e.g., Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 141
(recognizing desirability of “regional solutions, such as the creation of regional entities or interstate
compact” to address certain kinds of interstate environmental problems).
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decision-making that it originally promised. By contrast, the division of
regulatory authority between the national and state governments under
the CWA has generated a large, indeed excessive, degree of
decentralization, resulting in ineffective environmental management.
The overall goals of the CWA have, in consequence, been severely
compromised.
A regional approach, by contrast, could be effectively tailored to
reap the benefits of decentralized environmental management, while
preserving the benefits of national authority. My endorsement of
REMAs is intended to explore these possibilities. In what follows, I
offer some preliminary architectural renderings of how REMAs may be
structured, the scope of their responsibilities, and a general assessment
of how they may increase the overall effectiveness of our environmental
laws. I will focus particularly on the CWA and the CAA, but offer some
speculation about how the authority of REMAs might be expanded over
time to promote a more holistic, integrated approach to environmental
management that spans across other federal environmental laws.
A.

Demarcating Regional Boundaries: A Provisional Approach

The regional approach I suggest here is not intended to be an
exercise in applying any specific version of the Matching Principle.
While the scale of many of our existing environmental problems may,
from a geographic perspective, fit nicely within or coincide with
regionally-based institutions, I agree with Professors Adelman and Engel
that “[t]he matching principle fails because no systematic way exists to
bound most environmental problems, and thus to ensure that all of the
costs and benefits are internalized by the regulating entity.” 197
Nonetheless, any attempt to establish regionally-based institutions must
cope with the problem of demarcating the “regions” within which the
institutions are to operate. The scope and character of environmental
problems, while not determinative of jurisdictional boundaries, must be
taken as a primary consideration.
A starting point is the current structure of the Environmental
Protection Agency, which includes regional components—namely
The current configuration and
EPA’s ten regional offices. 198
geographical boundaries of these existing EPA regions may promote
suitable variation in environmental policy, but the present configuration
197. See Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1817.
198. See About EPA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/index.html (last
visited May 5, 2013).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9

36

Williams: Toward Regional Governance
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

9/19/2013 2:51 PM

1083

could be fine-tuned to better reflect the nature and scope of extant
environmental issues and the diversity of preferences among affected
communities.
Paul Weiland and Robert Vos have usefully suggested that EPA’s
regional offices be organized along “eco-regions,” which they describe
as “blend[ing] a respect for natural features of the land with an
understanding of how humans already live with natural systems in terms
of economic production and cultural identification.”199 One of the basic
commitments of this approach to locating jurisdictional boundaries,
which I share, is that it promises a greater connection between regulatory
institutions and the “places that people relate to.” 200 In this way,
institutional arrangements can better reflect shared cultural and historical
values, as well as common lived experience with particular
environmental problems. Of course, any effort to draw jurisdictional
lines on a map will involve large amounts of guess-work, even
arbitrariness. I do believe, however, that any problems with the initial
drawing of boundaries may be mitigated by adjustments over time,
through broadly participatory processes.
B.

The Scope of Regional Authority: Limiting Reach While Expanding
the RegulatoryToolkit

Drawing again upon the existing structure of EPA, it is important to
recognize that EPA’s regional offices already enjoy some limited
measure of autonomy and are likely to be more knowledgeable of local
conditions and the ways in which existing approaches to environmental
problems are succeeding and failing in their respective regions. For
example, under the CAA, EPA’s regional offices are responsible for
reviewing and negotiating the terms of SIPs in the first instance, subject
to ultimate approval by EPA headquarters.201 In addition, these regional
offices review permits issued by approved state programs under the
CAA and CWA, and in the absence of approved state programs, issue
such permits themselves. 202 They are in frequent and repeated contact
with major stakeholders and state agency personnel within their regions.
Through these responsibilities, the regional offices have much greater
knowledge of local cultural and environmental conditions than does
EPA headquarters.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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To capitalize on this knowledge and experience, we should
refashion our major environmental programs to devolve greater authority
on these sub-national regional agencies, rebranding them as REMAs.
Each REMA would be headed by presidentially-appointed administrator.
Importantly, each REMA would have independent budget lines and the
attendant discretion to allocate funding according to the REMA’s basic
program and policy priorities. This is not to suggest that EPA should be
abolished. Many of the current functions performed centrally by the
agency should be retained. In the context of CAA, for example, EPA
would continue to be responsible for regulating most mobile sources,
such as new motor vehicles, through nationally uniform emissions
limitations, with suitable allowance for state variation under the
It would also be responsible for
California waiver process. 203
responding to inter-regional spillovers, such as air pollution transport.
More generally, EPA would continue to fund and support basic and
applied scientific and technology research, maintain and augment
existing information clearinghouses, and to develop and support
innovative policy tools.
In terms of more specific program responsibilities under the CAA, I
will here only highlight some of the more important institutional
reforms. First, REMAs should be given authority to promulgate
regional ambient air quality standards to replace the existing NAAQS,
subject to a regulatory “floor.” The floor would be the more stringent of
either the existing NAAQS or existing air quality. These floors would
form a public health or anti-degradation baseline for new regional air
quality standards. For some regions, however, the existing NAAQS
should be a “soft” floor. Following the CWA’s approach to the
“fishable/swimmable” floor for state water quality standards, REMAs
should be given limited authority to promulgate time-limited, below-thefloor regional standards in those circumstances in which attainment of
the existing NAAQS is economically infeasible within a specified period
of years. This approach would displace the existing program that relies
on extensions of attainment dates to accommodate the most severe and
intractable air quality problems experienced in some nonattainment
areas. The more tailored and decentralized regional ambient air quality
standards would also allow for the retirement of some existing CAA
programs that seek to prevent significant deterioration in air quality in
those areas that have attained the existing NAAQS.

203. See Transportation and Air Quality: California Waivers and Authorizations, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY www.epa.gov/omswww/cafr.htm (last visited May 5, 2013).
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REMAs would also be given primary responsibilities that EPA
currently does not possess. Most importantly, REMAs would be
charged with developing regional implementation plans (“RIPs”) to
attain the regional ambient air quality standards. The existing, and
highly dysfunctional, SIP development and approval process would be
scrapped in its entirety, though, of course, existing SIP elements could
provisionally be incorporated in the RIPs, as appropriate, to provide for
a smoother transition of regulatory authority. RIPs would be developed
through a broadly participatory rulemaking process in which interested
local and state jurisdictions and private stakeholders would be consulted.
The regional scope of the planning effort may make greater use of such
policy innovations as emissions trading programs more practical and
effective, permitting more cost-effective reductions in emissions from
larger stationary sources of the more common, “criteria” pollutants and
their precursors. Existing state operating permit programs would be
retained, subject to continuing oversight by the REMAs. REMAs would
also be responsible for updating existing federal emissions limitations on
new and existing stationary sources.
As with the proposed reforms to the CAA, many of the
responsibilities of EPA and the states under the existing CWA would be
shifted to the REMAs. Existing state permitting programs (“SPDES”)
would be retained, but would be funded by permit fees like the current
Title V permitting program under the CAA. 204 As with the CAA
proposal, REMAs would gain authority that EPA currently does not
enjoy. REMAs, not states, would be responsible for promulgating water
quality standards and water management plans, many of which would
incorporate existing state water quality standards, with revisions as
deemed appropriate by the respective REMAs. In addition, REMAs
would be responsible for promulgating regional total maximum daily
loads (“TMDLS”) for impaired water segments that do not currently
meet the applicable water quality standards. These TMDLs would
include federally enforceable load allocations to non-point sources of
pollution, based primarily on reductions achievable through best
management practices. Again, the regional scope of REMAs’ authority
may make watershed approaches to water quality management more
practical and effective. Such watershed approaches may also promote
greater innovation, such as more effective use of effluent trading

204. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3) (1990) (requiring that state permit programs charge fees
“sufficient to cover all reasonable (direct and indirect) costs required to develop and administer the
permit program requirements of this subchapter”).
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programs in which non-point and point sources could participate. More
generally, REMAs would be given authority to impose direct restrictions
on non-point sources of water pollutants, requiring best management
practices and implemented through individual and general permits,
modeled loosely along the lines of the current Section 404 permit
program governing discharges of dredged and fill material into wetlands
and other environmentally sensitive aquatic environments. This would
finally put in place limited federal authority for monitoring and
regulating land uses that are impairing the nation’s water resources,
replacing the uncoordinated and ineffective control of such uses
currently vested in the states. There is little doubt that an appropriately
limited program governing such land use practices could survive
constitutional scrutiny, as precedent under the Section 404 permitting
program demonstrates. 205
C.

The Benefits of Regional Environmental Government: A Summary
Speculative Evaluation

The rough sketch of the scope and authority of REMAs provided
above is intended only to address some of the most problematic program
elements of the existing CAA and CWA regulatory programs. Yet, once
established, REMAs could serve as basic institutional building blocks
for more lasting and important reforms of our existing environmental
laws. The most fundamental change is to decouple the obvious need for
decentralized environmental management from the federalism-infused
approach embraced by our current institutional structure. In this way,
we can distance ourselves from a system that uses state political
boundaries as presumptively appropriate measures of decentralization
and move toward more environmentally relevant criteria, such as air
sheds and watersheds and the varieties of ways in which ecosystems and
citizens interact.
The decentralization provided by the establishment of REMAs
should deliver many of the benefits typically associated with federalism,

205. While the Court’s decisions in Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) might preclude the extension of
land use controls to protect water quality in remote and isolated waters, neither decision casts
constitutional doubt on Congress’s authority to control land use practices that adversely affect
“navigable waters.” However, the scope of that term might ultimately be defined. I do not mean to
suggest that the limitations imposed by Solid Waste Agency and Rapanos do not make effective
federal watershed management more difficult; they undoubtedly do. Nonetheless, the kind of land
use practices that may be reached by expanded federal regulatory authority will clearly make an
appreciable difference in watershed management.
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but which our current federalism-based approach has failed to deliver.
For starters, the establishment of semi-autonomous REMAs will bring to
our environmental law a greater sensitivity to regional variations in
environmental conditions and preferences for environmental quality.
REMAs can be expected to be responsive to regional preferences to a
much greater extent than is currently possible for EPA and the states,
respectively. This will permit scarce regulatory resources to be allocated
in ways to meet the environmental challenges deemed to be of the
highest priority within the respective regions.
Moreover, reallocating power to REMAs and away from the states
and EPA may tend to give local communities, such as cities and other
political subdivisions, a much more muscular voice in the shape of
environmental programs. Freed from the necessity to rely excessively
on the states to implement federal standards, REMAs may be able to
forge greater working relations with cities, counties, and special purpose
agencies and districts.206 When local governmental units are given a
voice separate and apart from the voice of the “state” in the shape and
content of national environmental programs, one may expect the national
authority to be more responsive to those local concerns. Concretely,
REMAs may be able to target grants and program resources more
directly to the local governmental units that need them than is currently
practical under our cooperative federalism model.
REMAs may also serve as laboratories in which innovative and
creative policies can be tested on a provisional and more limited basis
than is currently practicable under existing institutional arrangements.
No doubt, some of these policy innovations may fail, but some may
succeed, yielding transferable knowledge and experience upon which
other REMAs may build.
REMAs can also be expected to be much more nimble, flexible and
adaptive to changing conditions than our existing system, which yokes
together a central national agency and the states in an often
uncomfortable, if not conflictual, relationship that makes effective
coordination costly and difficult. States have resisted many of EPA’s
efforts to adapt our current programs to meet persistent environmental
problems, making change difficult, and in some cases, legally

206. As Frank Cross has argued, “State governments do not form the sort of integrated
communities appropriate to uniform policymaking. Given the ‘size of state government’ it is
‘difficult to credit the traditional belief that local self-determination could genuinely be achieved by
state autonomy.’” Cross, The Folly of Federalism, supra note 160, at 21 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 425 (1987)).
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impossible. 207 By giving REMAs primary authority for developing
regional implementation plans for air and water quality standards, this
friction can be eliminated, allowing for more responsive and effective
adaptations. This responsiveness and adaptability will likely grow in
importance as the effects of global climate change become more visible
and pronounced. Likewise, the disruptive effect of litigation may be
limited under a national environmental management system of linked,
but semi-autonomous REMAs because an adverse judicial decision
against one REMA’s actions will not be applicable to, or binding on,
other REMAs. 208 As a consequence, the environmental program as a
whole will be much more resilient than the existing institutional
arrangements.
REMAs may also enhance local participation in the development of
environmental regulation. Under the current institutional arrangements,
EPA rulemaking processes are dominated by a relatively small number
of repeat players, many of which lack knowledge of or sensitivity to
more local environmental conditions.209 National rulemakings are often
so broad in scope that local interests and stakeholders may find it
difficult to assess how particular regulatory proposals may affect them,
raising the costs of and creating disincentives for active participation. In
a regionally-based rulemaking, by contrast, the local effects of
regulatory proposals should be more salient, creating greater
opportunities for effective organizing among citizens and greater
incentives for participation. 210 Moreover, regionally-based rulemaking
proceedings are much more likely than national rulemakings to attract
environmental advocacy groups that are formed to protect particular

207. See, e.,g., Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that EPA may not
require states in ozone transport region to revise their SIPs to include a “California” vehicle
emissions program).
208. Promoting better legal decisions by the courts is an additional benefit of a regionallybased environmental management system. The current system relies extensively on the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as the court of choice for reviewing nationally applicable regulations
promulgated by EPA under the CAA and CWA. The CAA in particular makes the D.C. Circuit the
exclusive forum for review of “nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final actions taken,
by” EPA. 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) (1990). Review of decisions by REMAs could be lodged in the
court of appeals for the circuit that most closely aligns with the jurisdictional limits of the REMA.
By creating a greater diversity of reviewing courts, the REMA-based program may promote
differing views on recurring legal issues, enhancing the prospects of more carefully reasoned and
thoroughly considered legal doctrine. Thanks to Sam Jordan for this suggestion.
209. McGarity & Thomas, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385 (1991-1992).
210. See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 122-23 (arguing that under regional management
approaches citizen “participation might be amplified”).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9

42

Williams: Toward Regional Governance
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

9/19/2013 2:51 PM

1089

resources or address particular regional environmental problems. 211
More generally, REMAs may be capable of fostering cooperative
arrangements with local and state agencies and private stakeholders to a
much greater extent than is possible under current institutional
arrangements. Being in more consistent contact with such stakeholders
than is practicable under current arrangements, REMAs would be more
likely to gather meaningful information about particular environmental
problems and monitor the effectiveness of the responses that are made to
them. This may foster a form of adaptive management in which
environmental improvement is made through an iterative process of trial,
monitoring, and response. The closer working relationships that
REMAs may be able to foster with local stakeholders may also result
from the added leverage provided by the REMAs’ primary role in
developing enforceable implementation plan components for both air
and water resources. Through this leverage, REMAs may induce
otherwise reluctant stakeholders to participate in cooperative ventures to
improve environmental quality. A useful analogy of how such leverage
can yield policy innovations is the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
invocation of the take prohabition in the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) to fashion collaborative, large-scale habitat conservation
planning under the ESA’s incidental take permit program. 212
Over time, REMAs can also be expected to provide greater
opportunities to integrate various programs in ways that more effectively
address cross-media effects of various activities.213 By directing
regulatory resources to regional, rather than national problems, it is
likely that REMAs will be able to monitor cross-media effects more
closely and to respond to them more effectively. In the longer term, one
may expect REMAs to play an increasingly important role in larger scale
infrastructure planning and implementation, including the sitting of
energy-producing facilities, transportation networks, and water
development projects. The result may be a more holistic approach to
environmental management and a more sustainable and resilient network
of “eco-regions.” 214

211. See Jonathan Cannon, Checking In on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1142-45 (2006) (discussing how more locally-based advocacy groups may be
more likely to participate in regional management programs than national rulemakings).
212. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 367 (1998).
213. See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 118.
214. See id. at 118-119.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Our existing environmental laws rely extensively on a model of
cooperative federalism in which authority is divided among the national
and state governments. This approach to environmental management is
becoming strained and ineffective. The promised benefits of this form
of decentralized policymaking have not been realized, yet it is clear that
some degree of decentralization is necessary to ensure a sustainable,
adaptable and resilient regulatory system that effectively responds to
persistent and changing environmental problems.
Decentralizing
national power along regional lines may provide a way to secure these
important objectives. Regional Environmental Management Agencies,
properly scaled and vested with appropriate regulatory authority, are a
promising alternative to our now outdated, 1970s-vintage regulatory
programs.
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